By Marcus Cole 3 min read

The Cheapest Shot Is Not a Missile

At the Army's big trade show in the middle of October one of the primes showed a layered air defense concept with nothing new in the physics and a great deal that is new in the economics. The lower layer is a gun. It

At the Army's big trade show in the middle of October one of the primes showed a layered air defense concept with nothing new in the physics and a great deal that is new in the economics. The lower layer is a gun. It fires a hypervelocity projectile with no rocket motor in it, it is transportable by a medium cargo aircraft, and its magazine is described in tens to hundreds of rounds rather than in the handful a launcher holds.

The upper layer is a high power microwave system the company says is at a mid development maturity level and built from roughly ninety nine percent commercial off the shelf parts. Both are prototypes, and the only money attached to either is a planned Army figure of around six hundred and fifty million dollars through next fiscal year.

From the Battlefield to the Balance Sheet

The arithmetic of air defense has been going the wrong way for years and everyone in the business knows it. An interceptor costs between a few hundred thousand and a few million dollars. A great many of the things it is being asked to shoot down cost between a few thousand and a few hundred thousand. You can win every engagement and lose the exchange, and that is before you consider that the interceptor took a year to build and the target took a week.

Two ways out of that exist. Make the interceptor radically cheaper, which is what several companies are now attempting with common airframes and shared production lines. Or stop using an interceptor, which is what a gun and a directed energy weapon do.

A projectile with no rocket motor is interesting for a reason specific to this moment. The binding constraint across the entire munitions base right now is solid rocket motor capacity, and a round that does not contain one steps around that queue entirely. It is also a fundamentally different manufacturing problem, closer to artillery ammunition, with a supplier base that already exists and a unit cost an order of magnitude below a missile.

The microwave claim deserves the same reading. Ninety nine percent commercial content is not a performance statement, it is a cost and supply chain statement. It says the bill of materials is bought from an industrial market rather than from a defense one, which is where the price and the lead time actually come from.

The Dual-Use Reality Check

Directed energy is the dual-use story here and it runs in the unusual direction, from industry to defense. High power microwave sources, their power supplies, their cooling and their solid state amplifiers come from industrial heating, from medical and scientific equipment, from broadcasting and increasingly from the same gallium nitride device base that serves radar and telecommunications. That is a deep commercial supply chain, which is why ninety nine percent is achievable.

The gun side is the opposite. Barrels, breeches and the metallurgy to survive hypervelocity firing are a narrow defense specialty with the same forging and heat treatment constraints as every other heavy ordnance item, and that base is already fully committed.

Both systems also move the running cost from the magazine to the generator. A microwave shot costs essentially the price of the electricity, which is why the power and thermal engineering is the hard part rather than the emitter. Air defense that fires electricity rather than ordnance becomes an energy problem on the installation that hosts it.

The Capital Signal

The capital signal is that the air defense market is splitting along cost per engagement rather than along performance, and the parts of it that do not consume a rocket motor are structurally advantaged while motor capacity stays short.

The structural read is to be sceptical of all of it until something fires at a schedule. These are prototypes with a planned budget line rather than a production contract, and the graveyard of directed energy programmes is well populated with systems that worked in a demonstration and never survived the power, cooling and maintenance of a real deployment. Ask three questions of any such claim. What is the cost per shot including the platform. How many shots before something needs servicing. And what does it do in rain. The programmes that answer all three move to production, and the suppliers of power conversion, thermal management and ammunition handling benefit whichever prime wins.

Signal: Air defense is being decided on cost per engagement, and a round with no rocket motor in it sidesteps the industry's tightest bottleneck.

Marcus Cole, Top Margin

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